MVISION Insights: APT29 Tied To Election Fraud Phishing Campaign
Technical Articles ID:
KB94773
Last Modified: 8/10/2021
Last Modified: 8/10/2021
Environment
IMPORTANT: This Knowledge Base article discusses a specific threat that is being automatically tracked by MVISION Insights technology. The content is intended for use by MVISION Insights users, but is provided for general knowledge to all McAfee Enterprise customers. Contact McAfee Enterprise for more information about MVISION Insights.
Summary
The APT29 threat actor is suspected to be behind a spear-phishing email campaign targeted at multiple sectors located in the United States and Europe.
The emails appeared to originate from USAID and contained a malicious link which directed victims to an actor-controlled website.
A malicious ISO dropped a custom Cobalt Strike Beacon loader after the user downloaded the image file.
The McAfee Enterprise ATR Team gathers and analyzes information from multiple open and closed sources before disseminating intelligence reports.
This campaign was researched by Volexity and shared publicly.
How to use this article:
- If a Threat Hunting table has been created, use the rules contained to search for malware related to this campaign.
- Review the product detection table and confirm that your environment is at least on the specified content version.
To download the latest content versions, go to the Security Updates page.
- Scroll down and review the "Product Countermeasures" section of this article. Consider implementing them if they are not already in place.
- Review
KB91836 - Countermeasures for entry vector threats, which contains countermeasures . - Review KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
- Review KB82925 - Identify what rule corresponds to an Adaptive Threat Protection and Threat Intelligence Exchange event.
This Knowledge Base article discusses a specific threat that is being tracked and list of IOCs will change over time; check MVISION Insights for the latest IOCs.
Threat Hunting:
| YARA | rule apt_win_flipflop_ldr : APT29 { meta: author = "threatintel@volexity.com" date = "2021-05-25" description = "A loader for the CobaltStrike malware family, which ultimately takes the first and second bytes of an embedded file, and flips them prior to executing the resulting payload." hash = "ee42ddacbd202008bcc1312e548e1d9ac670dd3d86c999606a3a01d464a2a330" strings: $s1 = "irnjadle" $s2 = "BADCFEHGJILKNMPORQTSVUXWZY" $s3 = "iMrcsofo taBesC yrtpgoarhpciP orived r1v0." condition: all of ($s*) } |
| YARA | rule trojan_win_cobaltstrike : Commodity { meta: author = "threatintel@volexity.com" date = "2021-05-25" description = "The CobaltStrike malware family." hash = "b041efb8ba2a88a3d172f480efa098d72eef13e42af6aa5fb838e6ccab500a7c" strings: $s1 = "%s (admin)" fullword $s2 = {48 54 54 50 2F 31 2E 31 20 32 30 30 20 4F 4B 0D 0A 43 6F 6E 74 65 6E 74 2D 54 79 70 65 3A 20 61 70 70 6C 69 63 61 74 69 6F 6E 2F 6F 63 74 65 74 2D 73 74 72 65 61 6D 0D 0A 43 6F 6E 74 65 6E 74 2D 4C 65 6E 67 74 68 3A 20 25 64 0D 0A 0D 0A 00} $s3 = "%02d/%02d/%02d %02d:%02d:%02d" fullword $s4 = "%s as %s\\%s: %d" fullword $s5 = "%s&%s=%s" fullword $s6 = "rijndael" fullword $s7 = "(null)" condition: all of them } |
| YARA | rule apt_win_freshfire : APT29 { meta: author = "threatintel@volexity.com" date = "2021-05-27" description = "The FRESHFIRE malware family. The malware acts as a downloader, pulling down an encrypted snippet of code from a remote source, executing it, and deleting it from the remote server." hash = "ad67aaa50fd60d02f1378b4155f69cffa9591eaeb80523489a2355512cc30e8c" strings: $uniq1 = "UlswcXJJWhtHIHrVqWJJ" $uniq2 = "gyibvmt\x00" $path1 = "root/time/%d/%s.json" $path2 = "C:\\dell.sdr" $path3 = "root/data/%d/%s.json" condition: ( pe.number_of_exports == 1 and pe.exports("WaitPrompt") ) or any of ($uniq*) or 2 of ($path*) } |
Campaign IOC
| Type | Value |
| SHA256 | EE42DDACBD202008BCC1312E548E1D9AC670DD3D86C999606A3A01D464A2A330 |
| SHA256 | 94786066A64C0EB260A28A2959FCD31D63D175ADE8B05AE682D3F6F9B2A5A916 |
| SHA256 | 48B5FB3FA3EA67C2BC0086C41EC755C39D748A7100D71B81F618E82BF1C479F0 |
| DOMAIN | theyardservice.com |
| DOMAIN | worldhomeoutlet.com |
| DOMAIN | refreshauthtoken-default-rtdb.firebaseio.com |
| IP-DST | 83.171.237.173 |
| IP-DST | 192.99.221.77 |
| URL | https://dataplane.theyardservice.com/jquery-3.3.1.min.woff2 |
| URL | https://cdn.theyardservice.com/jquery-3.3.1.min.woff2 |
| URL | https://static.theyardservice.com/jquery-3.3.1.min.woff2 |
| URL | https://worldhomeoutlet.com/jquery-3.3.1.min.woff2 |
Minimum Content Versions:
| Content Type | Version |
| V2 DAT (VirusScan Enterprise) | 10006 |
| V3 DAT (Endpoint Security) | 4458 |
Detection Summary
| IOC | Scanner | Detection |
| EE42DDACBD202008BCC1312E548E1D9AC670DD3D86C999606A3A01D464A2A330 | AVEngine V2 | Trojan-FTRB!1C3B8AE594CB |
| AVEngine V3 | Trojan-FTRB!1C3B8AE594CB | |
| JTI (ATP Rules) | JTI/Suspect.196612!1c3b8ae594cb | |
| RP Static | - | |
| RP Dynamic | - |
| IOC | Scanner | Detection |
| 94786066A64C0EB260A28A2959FCD31D63D175ADE8B05AE682D3F6F9B2A5A916 | AVEngine V2 | Trojan-FTRB!1C3B8AE594CB |
| AVEngine V3 | Trojan-FTRB!1C3B8AE594CB | |
| JTI (ATP Rules) | - | |
| RP Static | - | |
| RP Dynamic | - |
| IOC | Scanner | Detection |
| 48B5FB3FA3EA67C2BC0086C41EC755C39D748A7100D71B81F618E82BF1C479F0 | AVEngine V2 | LNK/Agent.a.a |
| AVEngine V3 | LNK/Agent.a.a | |
| JTI (ATP Rules) | - | |
| RP Static | - | |
| RP Dynamic | - |
Minimum set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
Endpoint Security - Advanced Threat Protection:
Rule ID: 4 Use GTI file reputation to identify trusted or malicious files
Aggressive set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
Host Intrusion Prevention:
Rule ID: 1148 CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware Application
Rule ID: 6011 Generic Application Invocation Protection
