MVISION Insights: An overview of Wiper Malware
Technical Articles ID:
KB95729
Last Modified: 6/8/2022
Last Modified: 6/8/2022
Environment
IMPORTANT: This Knowledge Base article discusses a specific threat that is being automatically tracked by MVISION Insights technology. The content is intended for use by MVISION Insights users, but is provided for general knowledge to all customers. Contact us for more information about MVISION Insights.
Summary
Description of Campaign
Multiple destructive malware families, including Shamoon, Dark Seoul, Dustman, HermeticWiper, CaddyWiper, and AcidRain, among others, have been on the threat landscape for the last 10 years. This malware has been observed to attack multiple sectors across Saudi Arabia, Qatar, South Korea, Germany, and Ukraine. One malware, NotPetya, pretended to be ransomware but destroyed data instead of encrypting files.
Our ATR Team gathers and analyzes information from multiple open and closed sources before disseminating intelligence reports. This campaign was researched by Fortinet and shared publicly.
How to use this article:Threat Hunting
This Knowledge Base article discusses a specific threat that's being tracked. The list of IOCs will change over time; check MVISION Insights for the latest IOCs.
Campaign IOC
Minimum Content Versions
Detection Summary
Minimum set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign:
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
Endpoint Security - Advanced Threat Protection:
Endpoint Security - Exploit Prevention:
Host Intrusion Prevention:
Aggressive set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign:
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
VirusScan Enterprise - Access Protection Rules:
Host Intrusion Prevention:
Multiple destructive malware families, including Shamoon, Dark Seoul, Dustman, HermeticWiper, CaddyWiper, and AcidRain, among others, have been on the threat landscape for the last 10 years. This malware has been observed to attack multiple sectors across Saudi Arabia, Qatar, South Korea, Germany, and Ukraine. One malware, NotPetya, pretended to be ransomware but destroyed data instead of encrypting files.
Our ATR Team gathers and analyzes information from multiple open and closed sources before disseminating intelligence reports. This campaign was researched by Fortinet and shared publicly.
How to use this article:
- If a Threat Hunting table has been created, use the rules contained to search for malware related to this campaign.
- Review the product detection table and confirm that your environment is at least on the specified content version.
To download the latest content versions, go to the Security Updates page. - Scroll down and review the "Product Countermeasures" section of this article. Consider implementing them if they are not already in place.
- Review
KB91836 - Countermeasures for entry vector threats . - Review KB87843 - Dynamic Application Containment rules and best practices.
- Review KB82925 - Identify what rule corresponds to an Adaptive Threat Protection and Threat Intelligence Exchange event.
meta: description = "Detects Shamoon 2.0 Wiper Component" license = "Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE" author = "Florian Roth" reference = "https://goo.gl/jKIfGB" date = "2016-12-01" score = 70 hash1 = "c7fc1f9c2bed748b50a599ee2fa609eb7c9ddaeb9cd16633ba0d10cf66891d8a" hash2 = "128fa5815c6fee68463b18051c1a1ccdf28c599ce321691686b1efa4838a2acd" strings: $a1 = "\\??\\%s\\System32\\%s.exe" fullword wide $x1 = "IWHBWWHVCIDBRAFUASIIWURRTWRTIBIVJDGWTRRREFDEAEBIAEBJGGCSVUHGVJUHADIEWAFGWADRUWDTJBHTSITDVVBCIDCWHRHVTDVCDESTHWSUAEHGTWTJWFIRTBRB" wide $s1 = "UFWYNYNTS" fullword wide $s2 = "\\\\?\\ElRawDisk" fullword wide condition: ( uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 1000KB and 2 of them ) or ( 3 of them ) } |
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meta: description = "EldoS Rawdisk Device Driver (Commercial raw disk access driver - used in Operation Shamoon 2.0)" author = "Florian Roth (with Binar.ly)" reference = "https://goo.gl/jKIfGB" date = "2016-12-01" score = 50 hash1 = "47bb36cd2832a18b5ae951cf5a7d44fba6d8f5dca0a372392d40f51d1fe1ac34" hash2 = "394a7ebad5dfc13d6c75945a61063470dc3b68f7a207613b79ef000e1990909b" strings: $s1 = "g\\system32\\" fullword wide $s2 = "ztvttw" fullword wide $s3 = "lwizvm" fullword ascii $s4 = "FEJIKC" fullword ascii $s5 = "INZQND" fullword ascii $s6 = "IUTLOM" fullword wide $s7 = "DKFKCK" fullword ascii $op1 = { 94 35 77 73 03 40 eb e9 } $op2 = { 80 7c 41 01 00 74 0a 3d } $op3 = { 74 0a 3d 00 94 35 77 } condition: ( uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 2000KB and 4 of them ) } |
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meta: description = "Detects RansomWare GermanWiper in Memory or in unpacked state" author = "Frank Boldewin (@r3c0nst), modified by Florian Roth" reference = "https://twitter.com/r3c0nst/status/1158326526766657538" date = "2019-08-05" hash_packed = "41364427dee49bf544dcff61a6899b3b7e59852435e4107931e294079a42de7c" hash_unpacked = "708967cad421bb2396017bdd10a42e6799da27e29264f4b5fb095c0e3503e447" strings: $x_Mutex1 = "HSDFSD-HFSD-3241-91E7-ASDGSDGHH" ascii $x_Mutex2 = "cFgxTERNWEVhM2V" ascii // code patterns for process kills $PurgeCode = { 6a 00 8b 47 08 50 6a 00 6a 01 e8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 e8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8b f0 8b d7 8b c3 e8 } $ProcessKill1 = "sqbcoreservice.exe" ascii $ProcessKill2 = "isqlplussvc.exe" ascii $KillShadowCopies = "vssadmin.exe delete shadows" ascii $Domain1 = "cdnjs.cloudflare.com" ascii $Domain2 = "expandingdelegation.top" ascii $RansomNote = "Entschluesselungs_Anleitung.html" ascii condition: uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and filesize < 1000KB and ( 1 of ($x*) or 3 of them ) } |
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meta: description = "Detects Olympic Destroyer malware" license = "Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE" author = "Florian Roth" reference = "http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html" date = "2018-02-12" hash1 = "d934cb8d0eadb93f8a57a9b8853c5db218d5db78c16a35f374e413884d915016" hash2 = "3e27b6b287f0b9f7e85bfe18901d961110ae969d58b44af15b1d75be749022c2" hash3 = "edb1ff2521fb4bf748111f92786d260d40407a2e8463dcd24bb09f908ee13eb9" hash4 = "28858cc6e05225f7d156d1c6a21ed11188777fa0a752cb7b56038d79a88627cc" strings: $x1 = "cmd.exe /c (ping 0.0.0.0 > nul) && if exist %programdata%\\evtchk.txt" fullword wide $x2 = "cmd.exe /c (echo strPath = Wscript.ScriptFullName & echo.Set FSO = CreateObject^(\"Scripting.FileSystemObject\"^)" wide $x3 = "del %programdata%\\evtchk.txt" fullword wide $x4 = "Pyeongchang2018.com\\svc_all_swd_installc" fullword ascii $s1 = " $s2 = "SELECT ds_cn FROM ds_computer" fullword wide $s3 = "\\system32\\notepad.exe" fullword wide $s4 = "%s \\\\%s -u \"%s\" -p \"%s\" -accepteula -d %s %s \"%s\"" fullword ascii condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 5000KB and ( pe.imphash() == "fd7200dcd5c0d9d4d277a26d951210aa" or pe.imphash() == "975087e9286238a80895b195efb3968d" or pe.imphash() == "da1c2d7acfe54df797bfb1f470257bc3" or 1 of ($x*) or 3 of them ) } |
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meta: description = "Detects new NotPetya Ransomware variant from June 2017" license = "Detection Rule License 1.1 https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/master/LICENSE" author = "Florian Roth" reference = "https://goo.gl/h6iaGj" date = "2017-06-27" hash1 = "027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745" hash2 = "45ef8d53a5a2011e615f60b058768c44c74e5190fefd790ca95cf035d9e1d5e0" hash3 = "64b0b58a2c030c77fdb2b537b2fcc4af432bc55ffb36599a31d418c7c69e94b1" strings: $x1 = "Ooops, your important files are encrypted." fullword wide ascii $x2 = "process call create \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe \\\"C:\\Windows\\%s\\\" #1 " fullword wide $x3 = "-d C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe \"C:\\Windows\\%s\",#1 " fullword wide $x4 = "Send your Bitcoin wallet ID and personal installation key to e-mail " fullword wide $x5 = "fsutil usn deletejournal /D %c:" fullword wide $x6 = "wevtutil cl Setup & wevtutil cl System" ascii /* ,#1 ..... rundll32.exe */ $x7 = { 2C 00 23 00 31 00 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 72 00 75 00 6E 00 64 00 6C 00 6C 00 33 00 32 00 2E 00 65 00 78 00 65 00 } $s1 = "%s /node:\"%ws\" /user:\"%ws\" /password:\"%ws\" " fullword wide $s4 = "\\\\.\\pipe\\%ws" fullword wide $s5 = "schtasks %ws/Create /SC once /TN \"\" /TR \"%ws\" /ST %02d:%02d" fullword wide $s6 = "u%s \\\\%s -accepteula -s " fullword wide $s7 = "dllhost.dat" fullword wide condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 1000KB and ( 1 of ($x*) or 3 of them ) } |
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{ meta: copyright = "Intezer Labs" description = "Shamoon, ZeroCleare and Dustman" author = "Intezer Labs" reference = "https://analyze.intezer.com" date = "2020-01-09" condition: Intezer_Iranian_Wipers1 or Intezer_Iranian_Wipers2 or Intezer_Iranian_Wipers3 } |
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meta: description = "Detecting variants of Hermetic Wiper malware discovered in UA" author = " cb @ Trellix ATR" date = "2022-02-24" rule_version = "v1" malware_type = "Trojan" strings: $0 = {E4B5518CD941310A015E4AF8E5968C8231492FE19246A293A569D5D7A36F56EB2FC5B68FFF6F3359C19AF6806920C3FE6628F90A75440E6616297A031BA6075100D72DFAA9829E772E45D77B89F862081EAFDB19B4B2DCEF3F273FF645ACCEAA4B991F98373973C0FB25829E860D9BC195EF1A0AD9219456AD077D42868EE03EE00E88D04C434BA97E88DF99273A35E2C668A1C69954B4762390ABDFBE4CD4AF.EN_US} $1 = {90506F1C825F7AE0D8605F5C627CA325BFF199AB60A63DE8A90E923F4B18D7FB039E1DEC89D573AAB0A14C1D4BA70EB444753A41C03082A60CB4DB551393F2C50988A3181E7F31D01B5AAD94070432D98F18655AB8A555919FEFEA9DE1EDF1.EN_US} $2 = {D5EEF61336015A85FF04ED298A6BDD6742FF153E33DAF9B383A5FFDCE7E64D47748DB5FF2609DF9BD5C66735FF6916797B2D365313FF1461EAEB9DAEA754FF6D4D55D1956CC8CBFF75C10CE74BF88C8DFF3B553B839D42609FFF2916227230.EN_US} $3 = {6C750DDC932124500CE9B5AB91CE101BE9AD348220E9423124512282373675152281023428825C51770FE9841F853375125382F732750A5B83F60FEB6AEE2282647462228269745AEE22826F7452228275744AEE2282787442.EN_US} $4 = {19A8A063FFAAAF6C1E7F78A896FFFA5C8F30BA98B69CFF1961E107BEB7636AFF9EA56A4FC4EDE3F1FF295235ACD0185726FFADA6B8CB54B342C9FF86F58524DC91617BFFB4388DBE01B6CF86.EN_US} $5 = {50C449606B20184A6328556032197660AAF9507861609F6160640560B4546160C3A194056070C4A09EC4A01A0461A4C4A0831B16600561916069A291607061C09160AA1CB6204A.EN_US} $6 = {FFEB19D2636B8B95273156BB63E8C78470D55970F47CF26574B46DE86EE084704590CA8053F15320258BBD1AACF18B04F2E965C6605CB10880B7E8FCF53DF5EB0621635EFF.EN_US} $7 = {7E31126E14B8FF98554F6FCFB64207FFCF8D93B2573609C2FF99E4409F73BB9322FF1E5E380DC0BBABCAFF4B901EDF61BD6A68FFEE3253728C7769ABFF7BCDA939C959A282.EN_US} $8 = {1970FFC6F8AA7C32EE693CFF369579E5355EF62CFF682CEAF20BA3EA1CFF1AAC638666431B20FF54293D1E709C231AFFCD11B55599F64CB9FF1E5A9015DC867F.EN_US} $9 = {8DFF93B2573609C299E4FF409F73BB93221E5EFF380DC0BBABCA4B90FF1EDF61BD6A68EE32FF53728C7769AB7BCDFFA939C959A282D312FF5DD04F0370CE811F.EN_US} $10 = {DF5519064E31101CF3DA96C15FF96728B708F358F51759E3A22FFA1CF1BB986A2038D6753E6BF037945B8469ADF20BAB71E10F3DE27735F640704C970DFE8672.EN_US} condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 200KB and all of them } |
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{ meta: author = "ReversingLabs" source = "ReversingLabs" status = "RELEASED" sharing = "TLP:WHITE" category = "MALWARE" malware = "ISAACWIPER" description = "Yara rule that detects IsaacWiper trojan." tc_detection_type = "Trojan" tc_detection_name = "IsaacWiper" tc_detection_factor = 5 strings: $enumerate_physical_drives = { 55 8B EC 81 EC ?? ?? ?? ?? 53 56 33 F6 89 55 ?? 57 89 4D ?? B3 ?? C7 45 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 89 75 ?? 84 DB 0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B D6 8D 4D ?? E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 84 C0 0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A ?? 68 ?? ?? ?? ?? BA ?? ?? ?? ?? 8D 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? D1 E8 8D 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? BF ?? ?? ?? ?? 89 45 ?? 2B F8 83 C4 ?? 66 83 7D ?? ?? 8D 0C 41 8D 45 ?? 74 ?? 83 C0 ?? 66 83 38 ?? 75 ?? 8D 55 ?? 2B C2 D1 F8 8D 04 45 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 8B C2 8D 14 3F 50 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? D1 E8 83 C4 ?? 3B C7 8D 48 ?? 0F 46 C1 8B 4D ?? 03 C8 89 4D ?? 83 F9 ?? 73 ?? 8B 3D ?? ?? ?? ?? 8D 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A ?? 6A ?? 6A ?? 6A ?? 6A ?? 68 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 B3 ?? FF D7 83 F8 ?? 74 ?? 46 50 89 75 ?? FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? E9 ?? ?? ?? ?? FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 F8 ?? 74 ?? 32 DB E9 ?? ?? ?? ?? 68 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8D 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 85 C0 0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 3D ?? ?? ?? ?? 0F 83 ?? ?? ?? ?? 0F B7 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 66 85 C0 0F 95 C1 66 85 C0 0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A ?? 68 ?? ?? ?? ?? BA ?? ?? ?? ?? 66 89 45 ?? 8D 4D ?? C7 45 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? C7 45 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? D1 E8 8D 4D ?? BE ?? ?? ?? ?? 89 45 ?? 2B F0 83 C4 ?? 66 83 7D ?? ?? 8D 0C 41 8D 45 ?? 74 ?? 83 C0 ?? 66 83 38 ?? 75 ?? 8D 55 ?? 2B C2 D1 F8 8D 04 45 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 8B C2 8D 14 36 50 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? D1 E8 83 C4 ?? 3B C6 8D 48 ?? 0F 46 C1 8B 4D ?? 03 C8 89 4D ?? 83 F9 ?? 0F 83 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A ?? 6A ?? 6A ?? 6A ?? 6A ?? 68 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8D 45 ?? 50 FF D7 8B F0 83 FE ?? 0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A ?? 8D 45 ?? C7 45 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 6A ?? 8D 45 ?? 50 6A ?? 6A ?? 68 ?? ?? ?? ?? 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 F8 ?? 0F 94 C3 75 ?? 33 C0 83 7D ?? ?? 0F 44 45 ?? 89 45 ?? 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 84 DB EB ?? 84 C9 0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 5D ?? 8B D3 8B 4D ?? 6A ?? E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 7D ?? 8A C8 83 C4 ?? 33 F6 84 C9 74 ?? 3B F3 74 ?? 6A ?? 8B D6 8B CF E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8A C8 83 C4 ?? 46 83 C7 ?? 84 C9 75 ?? 46 84 C9 74 ?? 8B 5D ?? 3B F3 73 ?? 6A ?? 8B D6 8B CF E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8A C8 83 C4 ?? 46 83 C7 ?? 84 C9 75 ?? 8A C1 5F 5E 5B 8B E5 5D C3 } $corrupt_drive_thread = { 55 8B EC 83 E4 ?? B8 ?? ?? ?? ?? E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 53 8B 5D ?? 56 57 85 DB 0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 7B ?? ?? 0F 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 43 ?? 8D 4C 24 ?? 03 C0 BA ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 53 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 3D ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 ?? D1 E8 33 C9 66 89 4C 44 ?? 8D 44 24 ?? 50 FF D7 8B 35 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 68 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8D 44 24 ?? 50 FF D6 6A ?? 8D 44 24 ?? 50 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A ?? 8D 44 24 ?? 50 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 66 83 7C 24 ?? ?? 8D 44 24 ?? 74 ?? 90 83 C0 ?? 66 83 38 ?? 75 ?? 8D 4C 24 ?? BA ?? ?? ?? ?? 2B C1 D1 F8 8D 04 45 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 8B C1 8D 8C 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 ?? 8D 84 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 FF D7 50 68 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8D 84 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 FF D6 6A ?? 6A ?? 6A ?? 6A ?? 6A ?? 68 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8D 84 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B F0 89 74 24 ?? 83 FE ?? 0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 7B ?? 8B 5B ?? C7 44 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 85 DB 75 ?? 81 FF ?? ?? ?? ?? 0F 82 ?? ?? ?? ?? C7 84 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 89 84 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? B8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 8C 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B D1 C1 EA ?? 33 D1 69 CA ?? ?? ?? ?? 03 C8 89 8C 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 40 3D ?? ?? ?? ?? 72 ?? BA ?? ?? ?? ?? 8D B4 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? 89 94 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? 0F 1F 80 ?? ?? ?? ?? 81 FA ?? ?? ?? ?? 75 ?? 8D 8C 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 94 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 8C 94 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B C1 C1 E8 ?? 42 33 C8 89 94 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B C1 25 ?? ?? ?? ?? C1 E0 ?? 33 C8 8B C1 25 ?? ?? ?? ?? C1 E0 ?? 33 C8 8B C1 C1 E8 ?? 33 C1 89 06 83 C6 ?? 8D 84 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? 3B F0 72 ?? 8B 74 24 ?? 8D 44 24 ?? 6A ?? 50 68 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8D 84 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 85 C0 74 ?? 8B 44 24 ?? 3D ?? ?? ?? ?? 75 ?? 2B F8 83 DB ?? E9 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B C7 0B C3 74 ?? 57 8D 8C 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 ?? 8D 44 24 ?? 6A ?? 50 57 8D 84 24 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 56 FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 5F 5E 33 C0 5B 8B E5 5D C2 } condition: uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and ( $enumerate_physical_drives and $corrupt_drive_thread ) } |
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{ meta: author = "ReversingLabs" source = "ReversingLabs" status = "RELEASED" sharing = "TLP:WHITE" category = "MALWARE" malware = "CADDYWIPER" description = "Yara rule that detects CaddyWiper trojan." tc_detection_type = "Trojan" tc_detection_name = "CaddyWiper" tc_detection_factor = 5 strings: $destroy_if_not_controller = { 50 6A ?? 6A ?? FF 15 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 4D ?? 83 39 ?? 75 ?? EB ?? 8D 55 ?? 52 FF 55 ?? C6 45 ?? 43 C6 45 ?? 3A C6 45 ?? 5C C6 45 ?? 55 C6 45 ?? 73 C6 45 ?? 65 C6 45 ?? 72 C6 45 ?? 73 C6 45 ?? 00 8D 45 ?? 50 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 ?? C6 45 ?? ?? C6 45 ?? ?? C6 45 ?? ?? C6 45 ?? ?? C7 45 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? EB ?? 8B 4D ?? 83 C1 ?? 89 4D ?? 83 7D ?? ?? 73 ?? 8D 55 ?? 52 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 ?? 8A 45 ?? 04 ?? 88 45 ?? EB ?? E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B E5 5D C3 } $erase_drive_data = { C6 45 ?? ?? C6 45 ?? ?? C6 45 ?? ?? 8D 4D ?? 89 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A ?? 68 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A ?? 6A ?? 6A ?? 68 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 52 FF 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 89 45 ?? 83 7D ?? ?? 74 ?? 6A ?? 8D 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 6A ?? 6A ?? 68 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8D 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? 51 68 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 55 ?? 52 FF 55 ?? 8B 45 ?? 50 FF 55 ?? 8A 4D ?? 88 4D ?? 8A 55 ?? 80 EA ?? 88 55 ?? 8B 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 E9 ?? 89 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? 85 C0 0F 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B E5 5D C3 } $erase_drives_recursively_1 = { 55 8B EC 81 EC ?? ?? ?? ?? C7 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? FF FF FF FF C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 2A C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 5C C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 8D 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 8B 4D ?? 51 8D 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 52 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 ?? 8D 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 8D 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? 51 8D 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 52 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 ?? C7 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 00 00 00 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 46 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 69 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6E C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 64 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 46 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 69 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 72 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 73 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 74 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 46 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 69 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6C C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 65 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 41 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6B C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 65 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 72 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6E C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 65 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6C C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 33 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 32 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 2E C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 64 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6C C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6C C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 C6 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 00 8D 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 8D 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? 51 E8 } $erase_drives_recursively_2_p1 = { 8D 45 ?? 50 8D 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? 51 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 ?? 89 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8D 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 52 8D 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 FF 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 89 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 BD ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 75 ?? E9 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 E1 ?? 0F 84 ?? ?? ?? ?? 0F BE 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 FA ?? 75 ?? 0F BE 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 85 C0 74 ?? 0F BE 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 F9 ?? 75 ?? E9 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 E2 ?? 75 ?? 8B 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 E0 ?? 74 ?? E9 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8D 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? 51 8B 55 ?? 52 8D 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 ?? 8D 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? 51 8D 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 52 8D 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 ?? 8D 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? 51 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 ?? 8D 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 52 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 ?? E9 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8D 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 8B 4D ?? 51 8D 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 52 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 ?? 8D 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 8D 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? 51 8D 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 52 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 ?? 8D 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 ?? 85 } $erase_drives_recursively_2_p2 = { C0 75 ?? E9 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A ?? 68 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A ?? 6A ?? 6A ?? 68 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8D 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? 51 FF 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 89 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 BD ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 75 ?? E9 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A ?? 8B 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 52 FF 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 89 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 BD ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 73 ?? E9 ?? ?? ?? ?? 81 BD ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 76 ?? C7 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? C7 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 6A ?? FF 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 89 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? 51 8B 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 52 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 ?? 6A ?? 6A ?? 6A ?? 8B 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 FF 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 6A ?? 8D 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? 51 8B 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 52 8B 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 8B 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? 51 FF 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 52 FF 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 FF 55 ?? 8D 8D ?? ?? ?? ?? 51 8B 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 52 FF 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 85 C0 0F 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 50 FF 95 ?? ?? ?? ?? 8B E5 5D C3 } condition: uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and ( $destroy_if_not_controller ) and ( $erase_drive_data ) and ( all of ($erase_drives_recursively_*) ) } |
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meta: description = "Detects unknown malware with a few indicators also found in Wiper malware" author = "Florian Roth" reference = "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/" date = "2022-01-16" score = 75 hash1 = "dcbbae5a1c61dbbbb7dcd6dc5dd1eb1169f5329958d38b58c3fd9384081c9b78" strings: $x1 = "xownxloxadDxatxxax" wide $s2 = "https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/" wide condition: uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 1000KB and all of them } |
This Knowledge Base article discusses a specific threat that's being tracked. The list of IOCs will change over time; check MVISION Insights for the latest IOCs.
Minimum Content Versions
Detection Summary
Minimum set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign:
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
Endpoint Security - Advanced Threat Protection:
Rule ID: 4 Use GTI file reputation to identify trusted or malicious files
Rule ID: 259 Detect masqueraded files or process launches
Rule ID: 239 Identify suspicious command parameter execution
Rule ID: 263 Detect processes accessing suspicious URLs
Rule ID: 259 Detect masqueraded files or process launches
Rule ID: 239 Identify suspicious command parameter execution
Rule ID: 263 Detect processes accessing suspicious URLs
Endpoint Security - Exploit Prevention:
Rule ID: 6081 PowerShell Command Restriction - NoProfile
Rule ID: 6070 Hidden PowerShell Detected
Rule ID: 6135 Unmanaged PowerShell Detected
Rule ID: 6083 PowerShell Command Restriction - NonInteractive
Rule ID: 6070 Hidden PowerShell Detected
Rule ID: 6135 Unmanaged PowerShell Detected
Rule ID: 6083 PowerShell Command Restriction - NonInteractive
Host Intrusion Prevention:
Rule ID: 6113 T1055 - Fileless Threat: Reflective Self Injection
Rule ID: 6081 PowerShell Command Restriction - NoProfile
Rule ID: 6083 PowerShell Command Restriction - NonInteractive
Rule ID: 6070 Hidden PowerShell Detected
Rule ID: 6081 PowerShell Command Restriction - NoProfile
Rule ID: 6083 PowerShell Command Restriction - NonInteractive
Rule ID: 6070 Hidden PowerShell Detected
Aggressive set of Manual Rules to improve protection to block this campaign:
IMPORTANT: Always follow best practices when you enable new rules and signatures.
When you implement new rules or signatures, always set them to Report mode first and check the alerts generated. Resolve any issues that arise and then set the rules to Block. This step mitigates against triggering false positives and allows you to refine your configuration.
For more information, see KB87843 - List of and best practices for Endpoint Security Dynamic Application Containment rules.
VirusScan Enterprise - Access Protection Rules:
Prevent creation of new executable files in the Windows folder
Host Intrusion Prevention:
Rule ID: 6010 Generic Application Hooking Protection
Rule ID: 1020 Windows Agent Shielding - File Access
Rule ID: 1148 CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware Application
Rule ID: 2806 Attempt to create a hardlink to a file
Rule ID: 6011 Generic Application Invocation Protection
Rule ID: 1020 Windows Agent Shielding - File Access
Rule ID: 1148 CMD Tool Access by a Network Aware Application
Rule ID: 2806 Attempt to create a hardlink to a file
Rule ID: 6011 Generic Application Invocation Protection
